Between 2010 and 2015, a period of significant political change in Greece, the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), a minor party, achieved and consolidated major party status. This article explores the role of political strategy in SYRIZA's electoral success. It argues that contrary to accepted wisdom, targeting a 'niche' constituency or protesting against the establishment will not suffice for a minor party to make an electoral breakthrough. SYRIZA's case demonstrates that unless a minor party is ready to claim that it is willing and able to take on government responsibility, electoral advancement will not be forthcoming. The success of SYRIZA's strategy can be attributed to favourable electoral demand factors and apt heresthetic manipulation of issue dimensions.
Factors that work in favour of minor parties' electoral success are known to include institutional enablers such as low minimum requirements for parliament entry, enhanced proportionality of the electoral system and a high degree of state decentralisation (Lijphart 1994; Massetti & Schakel 2013) as well as certain demand side factors, such as changes in social values (Kitschelt 1988) , anti-party sentiments when directed towards established parties (Belanger 2004) , changes in public attitudes towards immigration (Norris 2005) , and particularly in the case of left parties increasing unemployment, rising levels of Euroscepticism or a historical legacy of left support (March & Rommerskirtchen 2014) .
Going beyond the formal 'rules of the game' and the contours of electoral demand, a number of studies have pointed out the decisive importance of party agency in what concerns the strategies major parties adopt when they compete for votes with minor parties (Meguid 2005) . Likewise, the strategies minor parties adopt to deal with the consequences of major parties' choices also matter greatly for electoral success. Minor parties, according to Norris (2005) , have three strategic options in order to increase their share of the vote: they may compete with major parties on mainstream, competence issues (i.e. economy, security, etc) claiming that they would do a better job; they may protest against the record of major parties or they may claim the 'ownership' of issues that are not prioritised by major parties because they lie outside the 'zone of acquiescence'.
For Norris, the competence strategy is the least likely to succeed given the lack of expertise, lack of government experience and credibility of minor parties which does not militate in favour of convincing the median voter. In comparative perspective radical left parties (RLPs) have attempted to gain credibility by becoming junior government partners. This has generally not been an electorally successful strategy for them. In their study of European RLPs in government between 1990 and 2010 Olsen & al (2010, p. 182) demonstrate that where an RLP has entered a coalition government it has lost on average 25 per cent of its vote share. Major parties will tend to present government success as their own while minor parties struggle to demonstrate their positive and distinct contribution.
The protest strategy may be more promising for minor parties' electoral success but for Norris it is a risky strategy; the vote of the disaffected may be claimed by other parties as well. As noted already a decade ago, some RLPs will deploy social populist Manichean discourses in order to mobilise 'us', the pure people, versus 'them', the corrupt elites (March & Mudde 2004 ) in pursuit of electoral success. Parties such as Die Linke or the Dutch Socialist Party that have used left populist arguments have indeed had highly successful albeit volatile electoral performance (Keith & March 2015) . Joint mobilisations with social movements and grassroots organisations are also important in RLPs' electoral strategies.
Both populist discourse and grassroots mobilisation are more effective when RLPs are in opposition (Tsakatika & Lisi 2013) .
The best chances of electoral success for minor parties, in Norris' view, come from the strategy of claiming ownership of issue gaps left by major parties (Norris 2005, pp. 6-7) . The aim of this strategy is to capture the votes of marginal, or 'niche', groups. RLPs have tried the 'issue ownership' strategy, particularly with issues such as defence of the welfare state (Olsen et al 2011) , or the rights of precarious workers, young people or immigrants while in government as a junior partner or while in opposition, with varied electoral success. This is the 'safest' strategy, although it might be argued that it also has its weaknesses. For instance, if major parties perceive a growing threat they may decide to appropriate rather than accommodate the minor party's message (Bale 2003) .
Insightful selection and seamless implementation of one or more of these strategies will not necessarily lead a minor political party to electoral success, given that such parties face fierce competition for electoral space by other parties with strategies of their own. Minor parties' strategic endeavours are particularly ridden with obstacles due to the very limited ability they have to determine the terrain upon which electoral competition is to take place compared to major parties. However all is not lost. Riker's concept of 'heresthetics' is useful here. 'Heresthetics' refers to a set of tactical manoeuvres which allow persistent 'losers' to be transformed into 'winners' in politics (Shepsle 2003) . Heresthetics is about 'structuring the world so you can win' or striving to 'alter decisively the strategic context in which he or she finds him or herself so as to render it more amenable to strategies for realising his or her intentions' (Hay 2009, p. 276 ) by controlling agendas, strategic voting or manipulating issuedimensionality (increasing or reducing the number of relevant issue dimensions) in public debate (McLean 2002) . It is particularly the latter that politicians engage with more regularly.
The heresthetic move that can be expected of a party that expects to lose an electoral contest would be that of modifying the number of salient issue dimensions (Riker 1986, pp. 1-9) . On the contrary, a party that expects to win will strive to fix the number of existing salient issue dimensions and avoid the emergence of a new dimension that would divide the majority that the party commands (Riker 1986, pp. 66-76) .
It will be shown that while SYRIZA and its minor party competitors faced the same institutional constraints, SYRIZA's electoral strategy was the winning one for two reasons.
First, because its choice of strategy met demand side factors to a greater extent than the strategies of its minor competitors. Secondly, because using the manipulation of issue dimensions successfully SYRIZA laid the groundwork for its electoral strategy to bear fruit. In so doing, SYRIZA beat the odds, transforming itself from 'loser' to 'winner'. Greece's two-party system featuring the centre-left PASOK and centre-right New Democracy that had dominated the country's politics for 40 years (Pappas 2013 ) was already in a process of transformation. At least since 2007 Greek bipartyism was in decline, in terms of the total share of the vote that the two main parties commanded, party identification and the levels of trust that citizens placed in the political system (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis 2014, pp. 224-228) . However, it was only after the ratification of the May 2010 bail-out agreement by the Greek Parliament that a domino effect was triggered whose outcome would be the complete reshaping of the party system between 2010 and 2015. becoming main party of government (Eleftheriou 2015) . (Table 1) .
Protest
The period between June 2011 and June 2012, was characterised by very high levels of social mobilisation and electoral volatility (Rudig & Karyotis 2014) . Over the course of that period SYRIZA abandoned its 'issue ownership' strategy that had targeted a niche youth constituency and refocused its protest strategy, aiming to mobilise the discontent of the extensive social strata that were being adversely affected by the austerity measures associated with the MoU (Katsambekis 2015) .
Continuity with SYRIZA's pre-2010 protest strategy was obvious in its refusal to act as a government partner to the parties that had ruled the country before the crisis, its 'soft'
Eurosceptic position and most importantly, the types of mobilisation it continued to privilege, i.e. its support of strikes, street demonstrations and extra parliamentary co-operation with protest movements (Tsakatika & Eleftheriou 2013) . SYRIZA members took part wholeheartedly in the strikes, anti-austerity protests and social movements that emerged from the crisis, particularly the mass movement of 'the squares' or the Outraged 'In the squares it was easy for a political milieu that was already constituted (SYRIZA) to become hegemonic. In something that is so fluid and spontaneous and a first for a vast part of the people, in all this aura of direct democracy and Assemblies...our people were there anyway...there was no (formal party) decision to be there, we were just there' (Interview 2). In that meeting all party factions converged on the need to change the party's electoral strategy from a primarily protest strategy to a strategy that also involved claiming government responsibility:
'...the destruction is too overwhelming, we cannot proceed only with the movement, the movement cannot win and we must proceed to the next stage... everyone agreed. All of SYRIZA's components. It was an escape forward in a phase where the movement practices we were familiar with did not seem to work... because society achieved the greatest possible movement twice in 2011. In every town, in every village the people were on the streets. It hit the roof. Municipal bands were playing EAM songs, there was the big demonstration of Patras… the whole country was in a state of madness. There was nothing more that could be done (in terms of protest). And the Memorandum was approved. And so we said that this cannot be stopped only with the movement. We must move on to the second phase (Interview 1).'
This was the background to the concept of a 'Government of the Left' which SYRIZA proposed when it stepped forward and claimed government responsibility for itself on the run up to the May 2012 national elections (Eleftheriou 2015, p. 65) . It is very difficult to understand SYRIZA's electoral success without the claim for government responsibility articulated in terms of the 'Government of the Left': 'In the (first) 2012 (elections) we were aiming for a two digit result, ten, eleven, thirteen per cent... but we came across a phenomenon that took the form of a wave…This must be associated with what was going on in society in the meantime, our relationship with the social movements, the squares, all of that…but if I must isolate one factor (that explains electoral success) I believe that the Left appears as a force that says: good morning to you, we are here and we can take over the government of the country. Without this, in my view,
we may have had an increase in our percentage around ten per cent, but I do not think that we would have this leap, this take-off' (Interview 3).
SYRIZA's claim for government responsibility was coupled with the introduction of a competence strategy alongside its protest strategy. The main aim of this strategy was to strengthen the credibility of SYRIZA as a potential party of government given that it had had no substantial experience of government up to that point. SYRIZA tried to show that it had the best plan to lead the country out of the crisis and the best people to take that plan forward, facing an uphill struggle on both counts.
SYRIZA was a party of the radical left that was forced to come up with a plan for government having had 'no international point of reference or paradigm to point to' (Interview 2). The lack of experience of most SYRIZA cadres in posts of responsibility was a double edged sword when it came to credibility. On the one hand SYRIZA could claim that having had no government experience meant its cadres were not corrupt and hence could be trusted to run the country; They were inexperienced but they were 'new faces' that had not been involved in the clientelist spoils system that PASOK and New Democracy had built over the democratic period (Pappas 2013 ). On the other hand being new to professional politics its cadres were not recognised by voters, therefore SYRIZA's opponents could claim that they had no experience to run the country.
Within the SYRIZA leadership a difference of opinion (cutting across party factions) had been at work since the regional elections of 2010 on how to deal with this conundrum. At the time, the party decided to support the candidacy of Alexis Mitropoulos, a former PASOK member and prominent labour lawyer, for the leadership of the Attica region, the most populated and most politically significant in the country. Part of the leadership believed that:
'the (Radical) Left cannot become the majority, ergo it needs to break off a part of social democracy which it must reposition on the Left and working together with them will take us to the government' (Interview 1).
This did not entail a formal coalition strategy with the crumbling PASOK but rather it meant that recognisable cadres that leave PASOK would be welcome to collaborate with SYRIZA, The leader of the party himself, Alexis Tsipras, was a representative of these 'new' characteristics:
'We had a charismatic leader who is… young, no one can attribute anything to him from the past, he has a strong critique against corruption…he comes from a process that is totally 'clean' (Interview 4). The credibility that SYRIZA had tried to establish before winning the January 2015 elections was tarnished by the failure of its plan (Moschonas 2015) . The way the seven month long negotiation process with the creditors (February-July 2015) unfolded, the imposition of capital controls in July 2015 and the U-turn that SYRIZA was forced to perform by signing the Third MoU in August 2015 put a major strain on the government's ability to lead the country out of its financial troubles. The argument that it had the most honest people to take responsibility for government was nonetheless still by and large available to the party. In the electoral campaign for the September 2015 elections SYRIZA thus attempted to compensate for the credibility loss it had suffered by projecting the left's 'moral advantage'.
In summary, between June 2011 and June 2012, SYRIZA's strategy underwent a major transformation. It moved away from a niche 'issue ownership' strategy directed towards young voters in two new directions: a 'protest' strategy' that involved both support for protest movements and a new populist discourse aimed at mobilising a broad constituency of disaffected voters; and a 'competence' strategy that saw the party claim government responsibility on the grounds that it was more capable to rescue the country and its cadres more honest compared to those of the 'old' parties that had ruled the country over the democratic period.
Explaining success: why SYRIZA won
Radical left party success often depends on the absence of a strong social democratic competitor (Olsen et al 2010) . Indeed over the period under examination SYRIZA primarily aimed to win over former PASOK voters that distanced themselves from the party en masse.
In so doing the party faced electoral competition from a significant number of contender 'Enhanced proportionality' reflects an electoral system that couples proportionality with a 50
(out of a total of 300) seat bonus for the party that receives the largest nationwide share of the vote and a three per cent entry threshold to Parliament. This is a system that offers a relatively low bar for representation thereby not excluding minor parties with a modest nationwide appeal. At the same time by rewarding the first party generously and penalising the second party, thus incentivising the polarisation of voters around two potential governing alternatives, the system has majoritarian effects. In other words, bar exceptional circumstances that would see voters distance themselves from the two major parties to a significant extent, such as the ones experienced over the 2010-2015 period, all minor parties would be expected to encounter relatively favourable conditions for entry to parliament but very serious institutional constraints in achieving major party status.
Why was SYRIZA's new strategy more successful in winning votes than the strategies of its competitors under similar institutional constraints? It will be argued in this section that SYRIZA's choice of strategy provided a better response to electoral demand compared to the choices made by its minor competitors. Furthermore, despite being a minor party SYRIZA succeeded in playing a part in shaping the context within which its major competitors' strategies unfolded. It did so in a way that favoured the success of its own strategy.
Meeting Demand
Four factors on the demand side could have been expected to favour not only SYRIZA but also other minor parties that were in competition with SYRIZA, mainly the KKE, DIMAR and
The River. First, there was a legacy of mass broad political identification with the left in
Greece going back to the 1940s (EAM) that left and centre-left parties could appeal to and have appealed to in the past (Tsakatika 2014) . The KKE and DIMAR could lay claim to this legacy to the same extent as SYRIZA. Yet SYRIZA came across as the most consistent representative of left unity. Not only was it itself a coalition of left wing groups and independents (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou 2013) , but also called for unity of all left parties against the austerity measures and the Memorandum of Understanding. On the other hand DIMAR was a split from SYRIZA itself and the KKE turned down all of SYRIZA's calls for a united front proclaiming its own strategy to be superior (Tsakatika 2014) . The way in which SYRIZA's protest strategy was crafted seems to have been more convincing to the electorate of the left, broadly conceived, because in contrast to its competitors SYRIZA could present itself as a unifying, rather than sectarian, political project.
Second, Eurosceptic attitudes that can be expected to provide fertile ground for minor protest parties (Taggart 1998) were on the rise in Greece over the crisis period (Serricchio, Tsakatika & Quaglia 2013) . Since it was 'soft' rather than 'hard' Euroscepticism that was on the rise (Clements, Nanou & Verney 2014, p. 263 ) SYRIZA could be argued to have been in a better position than both the 'hard' Eurosceptic Communist party and the 'uncritically' proEuropean DIMAR and The River to benefit from this upsurge. Indeed, SYRIZA held firm to its 'soft' Eurosceptic stance throughout the period in question. SYRIZA criticised the architecture of EMU and the Eurozone, democracy in European Union and the politics of austerity that the Union had 'constitutionalised' while making proposals for reform. At the same time, despite containing a vocal 'hard' Eurosceptic minority, the leadership and the majority of the party were consistent in their unquestioning support for Greece's continuing membership of both the European Union and the Eurozone.
Third, the sharp economic downturn that followed the adoption of the Memorandum, including the rise of unemployment and poverty, could have been expected to favour any of the minor protest parties, particularly on the left (Kriesi 2014) . A new constituency (Spourdalakis 2013, p. 106 ) was argued to have come into play bringing together the disaffected social categories most adversely impacted upon by the economic crisis, that is, inhabitants of large urban centres, salaried employees, the economically active population and younger age groups (Mavris 2012) . The KKE and DIMAR could have appealed to the economically disaffected to the same extent that SYRIZA did. DIMAR presented itself as a competent and reliable force on the moderate left that could set the country on course to economic recovery to the benefit of all. At the same time while being critical of the Memoranda of Understanding, DIMAR supported some of their modernising aspects and did not decline the invitation to join the Samaras government between 2012-2013 thus being more nuanced in its message and less inclined to act as the voice of popular discontent. The KKE held steadfast to a protest strategy that appealed to sectors of the working class and small business owners whose jobs and incomes had been affected by the crisis but refused to provide a medium-term plan in response to the crisis while resisting all invitations to take part in government. SYRIZA's protest and competence strategy seems to have been more attractive to the strata that were economically affected by the crisis since it offered both a way to express indignation and an immediate plan of action.
Finally, anti-party sentiments directed against the two major parties primarily on grounds of their lack of competence and perceived high levels of corruption had been running high even River from DIMAR. SYRIZA's competence strategy which ultimately relied more on honesty rather than experience seems to have been more in tune with demand, at least over the period in question.
In summary, SYRIZA's choice of strategy seems to have met electoral demand factors more successfully than the strategies adopted by other minor parties that the party was competing against for votes. It was more convincing in the answers it provided for voters' growing disaffection with PASOK and more broad negative orientations towards the two major parties. It was more in tune with Greek citizens' changing attitudes towards Europe. Finally, it offered voters a vehicle to express both their anger against the major parties and the hope that there is an alternative to austerity (Karyotis, Pamphilis & Rüdig 2016 ) that does not entail leaving the EU or the Eurozone.
Shaping the Strategic Context
After In the electoral campaign that preceded the September 2015 elections SYRIZA found itself in the awkward position of major party of government that had just agreed to a Third MoU while having spent the last few years and built its electoral success by criticising the Memorandum and the parties that had agreed to it. In order to avoid defeat, in line with
Riker's theory it would need to drop the Memorandum-anti-Memorandum issue dimension.
Since no other party among the main opposition parties had an interest in continuing to retain the Memorandum-anti-Memorandum as a salient issue dimension SYRIZA was able to drop it. It was the 'old'-'new' dimension that SYRIZA would now prop up as the main issue dimension along which party competition would take place. SYRIZA emerged as the main 'new' party along the 'old'-'new' issue dimension and having thus fixed the parameters for the strategic context in such a way that it was amenable to its competence strategy, it won the September 2015 elections by appealing to the left's 'moral advantage'.
In summary, the success of SYRIZA's heresthetics can be attributed to its actions in two key moments, November 2011 and the summer of 2015. In the first instance, SYRIZA took advantage of New Democracy's shift from an anti-to a pro-Memorandum position to maintain the Memorandum-anti-Memorandum issue dimension at the centre of public debate and dominate the anti-Memorandum camp. In the second instance, SYRIZA succeeded in imposing the 'new'-'old' politics issue dimension as central, while eliminating the Memorandum-anti-Memorandum issue dimension. In the first case SYRIZA influenced the parameters of public debate in a way that they became more amenable to the success of its protest strategy. In the second case it influenced the setup of issue dimensions in such a way that the ground was fertile for its competence strategy.
Conclusions
The present study of SYRIZA's political strategy makes a contribution to the broader literature on the electoral success of minor parties. It highlights the importance of the supply side and in particular the strategic choices confronting minor parties. It demonstrates that an 'issue ownership' strategy may well be safe if a minor party aims to consolidate a 'niche' in the party system, but it has a 'ceiling': a minor party needs to claim the big prize in the first place if it is to win it. Equally, a protest strategy on its own may help a minor party to mobilise a constituency of disaffected voters but it will not suffice for it to become a major party unless it claims that it is more competent to govern than its competitors. From a minor party's point of view a competence strategy need not be set out in terms of government experience as a junior coalition partner; it may be equally or even more effective when it is set out from the opposition on grounds of being a novice who can convince they would do a better job than the established major parties and is willing to assume government responsibility.
SYRIZA's victory took place against the background of truly exceptional events which radically changed the contours of electoral demand in Greece, leading to the total collapse of the PASOK vote after 2011. While the singularity of the Greek case is beyond doubt, European social democracy is under increasingly harsh electoral competition from a number of minor party contenders from across the political spectrum, while its 'crisis' has been extensively documented in the relevant literature (Keating and McCrone 2013) . Therefore, the study of SYRIZA's electoral strategy may well be relevant to understanding the electoral threat that radical left challenger parties present for social democratic parties.
Finally, the analysis of the SYRIZA case also makes a contribution to the study of heresthetics by exposing the need to rethink Riker's art of political manipulation from the perspective of minor parties. It demonstrates that being 'mere makeweights', that is, much more limited in the extent to which they can influence their strategic environment compared to major parties, minor parties' success can be expected to depend on the skill of their leaderships to take advantage of the heresthetic errors made by the major parties. This finding complements the current understanding of the 'manipulation of issue dimensions' as simply involving the introduction of a new salient issue dimension, the elimination of an existing issue dimension or the avoidance of the emergence of a new issue dimension.
These heresthetic manoeuvres are relevant primarily to major parties. When SYRIZA was still a minor party in 2011 its main victory lay in leveraging its association with the (antiausterity and anti-establishment) Outraged movement in order to maintain the saliency of the 
